1.
Why supply chain analysis of NTMs?
(a) The growing role of supply chains
In recent decades, it has become increasingly common to produce goods in a number of geographically dispersed stages linked by international trade. Such international supply chains have been described variously by economists as "production fragmentation" (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001 ), "processing trade" (Görg, 2000) , "vertical specialization" (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi 1998) , "slicing up the value chain" (Krugman, Cooper and Srinivasan 1995) , or "the second unbundling" . The implications of this global change in the organization of industry is that it takes many more export and import transactions to provide a single unit for final demand of complex goods like computers and automobiles than previously. While there are examples of production fragmentation going back to ancient times, 1 the widespread adoption of this method of production and trade has a number of implications for how the world economy works today. These include reallocating the value added by trade among different countries depending on where they fit in the supply chain (Koopman et al. 2010) (b) The inseparability of price gaps, and the desire to prioritize policy efforts At the same time, there is an increasing interest among policymakers in addressing barriers to trade other than tariffs, known collectively as "non-tariff measures" or NTMs 2 . As tariffs have 4 However, there are problems in moving from estimates of price gaps or quantity gaps to recommendations to policymakers. It is notoriously the case that when there is a preference to restrict imports, multiple NTMs may be in place. Indeed, exporting firms, or governments negotiating on their behalf, may remove one NTM only to see new ones emerge, leading to what is often called the "whack-a-mole" problem. 6 When there are multiple NTMs in place, it is natural for policymakers to want to know which are more restrictive or more important. Suppose that an imported product is affected simultaneously by non-automatic licensing, a technical standard, and slow customs procedures. The total effect of such procedures is estimated to be represented by a tariff equivalent of 50 percent. Is it possible to decompose the tariff equivalent, so that we can say, e.g. that nonautomatic licensing has a 25 percent ad valorem equivalent, the technical standard 15 percent, and customs procedures 10 percent? Such a decomposition would be very useful in prioritizing policy efforts, and targeting interventions to the most severe problems first.
In principle, price gaps cannot be so decomposed. Since there is only one distorted domestic price and one world price (after appropriate adjustments to each), there is only one price gap. No further information is available. If there are multiple policies, their individual and specific impact on the distortion in question is unknown. Indeed, it may be that one or more of the policies are binding constraints -there may be a key policy which, when removed, gets rid of most of the distortion, or it may be necessary to reform the whole set of policies in order for anything observable to happen in the market place. The same objection applies to quantity gaps in the presence of multiple NTMs -there is only one actual quantity observed in the market place, and one estimated quantity, and thus one nondecomposable quantity gap.
(c)
The possibility that NTM effects may cumulate in supply chains
In 2006, I proposed that NTMs could be decomposed by the study of goods as they move through supply chains. 7 The idea is to follow a typical exported good from its location of production (ex-farm or ex-factory) through multiple steps in the process of shipping and delivery. For example, goods once produced are moved to the export port; handled in the export port; moved internationally by water, air, or road; handled in the import port; cleared through customs, paying any applicable duties; moved in the import market; and subject to wholesaling and retailing. At each stage in the process the price of the good increases, as additional costs are imposed ( Figure 1) . Moreover, the costs associated with each move through the supply chain can now be separated into their constituent parts. Different policies and practices apply to each part of the supply chain. For example, market distortions in international shipping specifically affect the difference between the FOB and CIF prices; import customs procedures affect the difference between the CIF price and the landed dutypaid price, and restrictions on the size or hours of retail operations in the importing country affect the difference between the wholesale and retail price. Thus, it is possible at least in principle to have a common metric to compare the restrictiveness of different types of NTMs.
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Figure 1.
Traded-goods prices along the supply chain 8
Some costs, such as those associated with land transport to export or port procedures, may not represent NTMs as usually conceived, but may be amenable to trade facilitation interventions.
Another advantage of a supply chain framework is that NTMs, which raise prices of traded goods, and trade facilitation efforts, which should lower prices, can be compared using a common metric. Indeed, this reflects the general point that NTMs and trade facilitation can be analyzed with similar tools. 9 For example, inefficiencies in customs procedures are sometimes thought of as NTMs and sometimes as trade facilitation issues. Since this framework reveals the comparability of NTMs and trade facilitation, it does not matter what one considers them -improving customs procedures reduces a distortion.
The limited available evidence suggests that total markups along the supply chain can be substantial. In one widely-cited exercise, Anderson and Wincoop (2004) estimate that among developed countries, the typical cost increase from the factory in an exporting country to the retailer in the importing country amounts to 170%, consisting of 21% transportation costs, 44% border related 8 For an algebraic representation of Figure 1 , see Ferrantino (2006, Annex 1) . 9 Dee and Ferrantino (2005), Ferrantino (2006) , Shepherd (2010 currencies. An even higher estimate is given by Feenstra (1998) , citing Tempest (1996) , which suggests that the mark-up on Barbie dolls produced in China and sold in the United States is on the order of 900 percent.
While some of the costs associated with international trade are unavoidable, others are associated with policy-induced distortions or technological inefficiencies. Thus, it should be possible in principle to compare actual costs at each step of the supply chain with best-practice costs, consisting of necessary marginal costs of processing the goods in the absence of rents, and with efficient use of technology ( Figure 1 ). The differences at each step can be attributed to step-specific NTMs, or to unresolved trade facilitation issues. Some of these will have rents associated with them which accrue to specific actors, while others represent pure inefficiency. With a supply-chain decomposition, it would be in principle possible to identify where the greatest rents and inefficiencies are, and to identify policy priorities which are most likely to expand trade and benefit both producers and consumers of traded goods.
In principle, the price increase at each step should include not only the monetary costs of moving along the supply chain, but the costs associated with the time of waiting. Since Hummels (2001) , it is well-established that the delays experienced by traders are perceived as costly, as evidenced by the willingness of traders to pay more for faster air freight as opposed to slower water freight. Thus, they can be expressed as a tariff equivalent. Furthermore, these delays vary from product to product (Hummels et al. 2007) . Given measures of the delays associated with exporting and importing, such as those in the World Bank's "Doing Business" indicators for trading across borders, it is possible to simulate the effects of reducing those delays (Minor and Tsigas 2008) .
Moreover, time costs vary widely along inefficient transport corridors, often including an unpredictable "long tail" of very slow transit times (Arvis, Raballand and Marteau 2010; Christ and Ferrantino 2011) . Thus, the uncertainty of time costs ought to be considered along with the mean transit time.
The discussion that follows will consider the types of costs, both monetary and time costs, associated with traveling through each step of the supply chain, as well as the types of costs and delays attributable to policy. These policies may include NTMs as traditionally conceived, inadequacies in trade facilitation, or other types of policies insofar as they add to the costs and time associated with an international transaction. Such a framework could be used in a case study following a particular good through various stages of the supply chain. The result of such a study would be to identify those costs of moving goods which are technologically necessary, those which are due to technical inefficiency (such as poor roads), and those which are imposed by policy. The sum of the policy-induced costs along each step of the supply chain would amount to the NTM price gap as traditionally conceived, decomposed by the type of policy involved. Both the policy-induced costs and the technical inefficiencies would potentially be amenable to policy interventions that would reduce the overall price and time gap between exporters and importers and expand trade.
The quantitative illustrations of the effect of NTMs on supply chains in this paper frequently draw on metrics developed in the study of trade facilitation and transport costs. This is for both a general and particular reason. First, the analysis of NTMs and trade facilitation is largely analogous, since one examines factors that make trade more difficult and the other considers policies that make trade easier (Dee and Ferrantino 2005 Let us consider first the case of a good which is produced in a single location in the exporting country, such as an agricultural good or a carpet, and simply moved from place to place until it reaches the consumer in the importing country, following the steps illustrated in Figure 1 . 10 One of the insights derivable from the supply chain approach is that there may be market power exerted at various stages along the supply chain, with each transfer point representing a bilateral monopoly or bilateral oligopoly. The difference between the retail price the consumer in the importing country pays and the ex-farm/ex-factory price, minus all necessary average costs for logistics, equals the total amount of rents extractable along the supply chain. Exertion of more market power at any point along the supply chain squeezes rents at other points along the supply chain, as well as increasing the overall "Barbie-doll" markup between the original producer and the ultimate consumer.
(i) Ex-farm/Ex-factory
The good leaves the farm or factory at an ex-farm or ex-factory price, which may represent the average cost of production or may itself include a markup if the producer has market power. The costs of production themselves may be influenced by NTMs or other aspects of trade policy. For example, compliance with TBT or SPS measures in the importing country may involve changes in the production process that are costly. The additional costs required to meet a product standard in an importing market may be considered to be part of the NTM price gap embodied in the costs of production. There may also be separate production processes for an export market, to which an NTM applies, and the domestic market, to which it does not. (
ii) Movement to port
In an undistorted market, with competition among trucking companies, the difference between the ex-farm/ex-factory price and the price at the port gate should equal the average cost of providing trucking services along the route in question. Such costs may be high both for natural reasons, such as landlocked status or difficult terrain, and for artificial reasons such as lack of competition among trucking companies. The monetary costs of trucking alone are on the order of 10-50 percent of the ex-farm price for most exports from the Central African Republic, Chad, and
Zambia. The time costs associated with road transport alone are higher, as high as 166.8 percent for cotton exports from Chad (Christ and Ferrantino 2011) . Some of these costs are due to geographic difficulties in remote locations. Additional costs may arise due to the cartelization of trucking services (Arvis, Raballand and Marteau 2010) , which is widespread in sub-Saharan Africa and which interacts with physical difficulty of transport -roads which flood or break axles reduce the number of trucking companies willing to travel down them, which in turn makes it easier for the companies willing to serve the market to collude. Both the physical difficulty of transport and the cartelization of transport may be addressed by policy -the former by investments in infrastructure, the latter through competition policy and market-based reforms.
(iii) Export procedures
Export procedures may take place at a seaport, airport, or land crossing. If we consider the example of a seaport, which is still the most common case, these procedures consist of warehousing, 11 yard procedures such as stacking of containers, loading of ships, and various bureaucratic formalities. Some of these are analogous to import port procedures and will be discussed in more detail under that heading. Port warehousing is often in short supply in developing countries, increasing its cost when it is available or causing time delays which have a tariff equivalent. In many cases, trucks are used as makeshift warehouses with the associated risk of theft of cargo. Thus, improvement of warehousing by port authorities has a tariff (or more precisely, export tax) equivalent in terms of both cost, time, and uncertainty. Bureaucratic procedures associated with exporting are generally less than those associated with importing, because export taxes are less often collected then customs duties. Nonetheless, such procedu1res can cause a non-trivial burden on exporters. A recent survey of traders in six developing countries, 12 conducted by UNCTAD and ITCGeneva, identified 6,225 cases of NTMs, of which approximately 2.6 percent (about 160) were related to export procedures (Basu, Kuwahara and Dumesnil 2011) . The bulk of the complains concerning export NTMs were about certification requirements imposed by the exporting country (e.g. for SPS purposes), licensing or permit requirements imposed by the exporting country in order to export; and export taxes. Chile, and the United States -the CIF-FOB margin has declined both on average and for both sea and air modes in all cases, except for air transport in Chile (Table 1) . This means that improvements 12 in shipping efficiency have been more than sufficient to outweigh the increasing share of international cargo that moves by air. (2010) International shipping costs which exceed the technological maximum may be due either to technological inefficiencies (e.g. smaller ships on certain routes) or to market imperfections. Private anticompetitive practices raise shipping rates both by sea and air. Global shipping alliances, known as "conferences", dominate containership service, and consolidation has proceeded both by mergers and joint ventures. In some cases, shipping conferences are given exemptions from national antitrust laws. Estimates of the impact of maritime conferences, price-fixing agreements and associated cooperative working agreements (including vessel-sharing) vary. Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) find that maritime conferences add at most 5 percent to transport costs, while Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2002) estimate that on U.S. routes, the breakup of cooperative working agreements would decrease transport costs by more than 7 percent, while the breakup of price fixing agreements would cause prices to decline by a further 19 percent. Micco and Servrisky (2004) find that increased air competition, such as that associated with the U.S. Open Skies agreement in the 1990s, could reduce air transport costs by 8 percent. Francois and Wooton (2001) , in a theoretical paper illustrated with empirical data, show that the gains from tariff liberalization in the presence of market imperfections 13 in shipping could be limited, accruing primarily as additional rents to shipping firms rather than as gains to exporting producers and importing consumers.
14 The costs of shipping services vary across products and countries in ways that remain to be fully documented, though data are improving (OECD 2011). It is certain, though, that the costs associated with market power fall more heavily on developing countries and smaller markets, simply because the number of daily departures available in a port such as Mombasa or Douala is far fewer than those serving Los Angeles, Shanghai, or Singapore. The same market forces that cause U.S. air travelers to pay higher ticket prices traveling to Boise or Cheyenne than to New York or Chicago boost air and shipping rates to developing countries, even if all technical inefficiencies associated with transport were absent.
(v) Import port procedures
The costs associated with import port procedures vary widely from location to location, and over time. Blonigen and Wilson (2006) use U.S. trade data on "import charges" to identify the relative efficiency of U.S. and foreign ports. Import charges are defined as "the aggregate cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in bringing the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of exportation -in the country of exportationand placing it alongside the carrier at the first port of entry into the United States." This amount includes costs associated with the non-U.S. export port, international transport costs, and costs associated with the U.S. import port, i.e. the CIF-FAS margin. 15 There are substantial differences in costs associated even with U.S. import ports. For example, import costs associated with the port of Gulfport, Mississippi are about 8 percent lower than those associated with the reference port of Oakland, California, while those associated with Port Arthur, Texas, are 26 percent higher than Oakland, and import costs for San Juan and Honolulu appear to be even higher. Similar differences 14 See USITC (2005, chapter 5), for further discussion of both technological and market-based impediments to logistic inefficiency. 15 The difference between FAS (free alongside ship) and FOB (free on board) is that the former does not include the costs of loading the vessel, while the latter does. The CIF-FAS margin is thus slightly higher than the CIF-FOB margin. FAS is referred to as "customs value" in U.S. trade data, since customs duties are levied on the FAS value rather than the CIF value as in most other countries. 14 exist in costs associated with exporting to the United States -export port costs associated with Bonny, Nigeria are 79 percent higher than those associated with Rotterdam. 16 Port efficiency can be associated with both technical factors (such as crane unloading moves per hour and efficiency of stacking and unstacking containers) and with management factors potentially addressable by public policy. For example, the ownership and operation of port assets can be structured in a number of different ways. Government authorities may own and operate port infrastructure (a "service port"), allow private firms to supply port and maritime auxiliary services (a "landlord port"), or also allow private firms to lease and operate port assets (a "tool port").
Privatization of port assets can be associated with efficiency gains (Fink, Mattoo and Neagu 2002; Londoño-Kent and Kent 2003) . Further, efficiency can be measured for different parts of port procedures, which may be associated with different public and private actors. Table 1 gives a breakdown of procedures in an import port which can be further used to decompose inefficiencies and policy-related costs associated with import charges. Note that some of these procedures (e.g. fumigation) may also be associated with SPS policies. 16 Calculated by the author using an exponential transformation of reported fixed effects in Blonigen and Wilson (2006) , based on a semi-logarithmic specification. The Twelve Sub-Stages of Import Port Procedures 1. The process of physically guiding the vessel into the berth, which involves navigation, pilotage, tug assist and line handling charges; 2. Application of berthage or "parking" charges to vessels secured to the berth; 3. Inspection, e.g. for security and drug enforcement; 4. Unloading by crane, the efficiency of which is measured in crane moves per hour, and which incurs charges if the port's rather the ship's crane is used; 5. Charges for "wharfage," the use of the apron and other areas in which cargo is moved around; 6. Inspecting the seal; 7. Dispatching the cargo to and from an assigned spot in the yard; 8. Storage, either in the port or in an alternate storage facility such as a bonded warehouse; 9. Customs clearance per se; 10. Fumigation, if necessary; 11. Possible charges for trucks enter the port from inland; and 12. Gate processing at the point of physical exit from the port.
Each stage involves identifiable costs and/or time.
Source: Londoño-Kent and Kent (2003), as adapted in Ferrantino (2006) .
(vi) Customs
Costs and delays associated with customs procedures are widespread. Customs procedures giving rise to complaints include documentation requirements, direct consignment requirements (goods must be shipped directly from the country of origin without passing through a third country), restrictive regulations on land, sea, and air transportation, and requirememts to pass through a specified port of customs, which could slow down the import clearance process. Some requirements to pass through a specific point of entry are associated with SPS and TBT testing. 17 Using 2007 data from the World Bank's Doing Business Trading Across Borders data, Minor and Tsigas (2008) calculate that time associated with customs procedures ranges from an average of 2.0 days in highincome Europe to 9.1 days in low-income sub-Saharan Africa, with better and worse performances in Apple's shares are included. These calculations do not reflect international transport and distribution, nor do they reflect the relatively small share of value captured by China, but they are illustrative of point that the amount of total markups behind the border in the importing country can be substantial.
Some part of wholesale and retail markups are no doubt due to technical inefficiencies in logistics or bad transport, similar to that discussed previously under the heading of movement to port. Others may be associated with policies regarding the industrial organization of wholesaling and retailing, such as limited entry into logistics services, and restrictions on hours and locations of retail operations. These include both domestic barriers to entry and limitations on foreign direct investment in distribution, retailing, and domestic transport, which may be classified as NTMs insofar as they affect the market for internationally traded goods.
(b) A hub-and-spoke supply chain
The above discussion of NTMs and other costs along the supply chain assumes a fairly simple case in which a single good is moved from place to place without being transformed. However, many modern supply chains are more complex than this, involving different stages of production in different countries, and gathering components together from many locations for final assembly. This is particularly true for manufactures with multiple components such as electronics and motor vehicles.
A classic example of this is the production of a computer disk drive as discussed in Hiratsuka (2005) and . The disk drive is assembled in Thailand, which acts as the hub of the supply network, using 43 components from 10 other countries and 11 components produced in Thailand. Thus, there are at least 10 international moves of the type described above, and likely more, depending on the extent to which shipments can be bundled. Since the disk drive will be shipped to the location of final computer assembly (e.g. China), at which other major components are gathered, the number of cross-border moves multiplies. China then serves as a larger hub linking the disk drive hub as well as other hubs for major components. To all the cross-border moves in such a network must be added the final move of the finished product to the consumer.
As Hiratsuka (2005) notes, logistics firms have a number of strategies for reducing the number of times material has to be moved, including maintaining hub warehouses and the "milkrun" system, which involves regular truck runs within a country. It will be readily apparent that if there is a high degree of competition in sales of the final product, trade costs of all kinds must be reduced to a minimum in order for a hub-and-spoke supply chain to operate. If the sum total of NTMs, tariffs, transport and logistics costs in a certain region exceeds the maximum that can be borne by the final product price, the hub-and-spoke supply chain will simply not operate in that region -trade costs will act as a prohibitive barrier to the establishment of supply chains.
(c) The cumulation of trade costs along the supply chain It will be clear from the above discussion that in a supply chain which requires that semifinished goods cross international borders more than once, the effects of NTMs and other trade costs are compounded. This implies that the effect of a marginal increase in trade costs everywhere in the supply chain is much larger than would be the case if there were a single international transaction.
This point can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that the total value-added necessary to produce a product is equal to 1. The product is produced in stages in n countries, each of which adds (1/n) to the total value of the product. After production, the product will be exported to a final destination, so that it is moved n times altogether. Let trade costs for moving the product from one country to another equal t on an ad valorem basis. At each stage, the trade cost t is charged on the entire value of the product produced up to that point, including previous trade costs. Let c(n) be the total cost of the product delivered to the final consumer when it is produced in n stages, so that More formally, Yi (2003) has shown that when the structure of production is endogenous, so that the degree of vertical specialization depends on tariffs, a small decrease in tariffs can induce a tipping point at which producers introduce vertical specialization when it had previously not existed, so that there is a large and non-linear increase in international trade. By the same token, an increase in NTMs or other trade costs can have the reverse effect, making vertical specialization unprofitable, restricting trade to more simple production patterns involving fewer countries in the production of a particular good, and inducing a large and non-linear decrease in international trade. Such a model is more successful in explaining how the tariff reductions in recent decades could have induced the large observed increase in international trade than a model in which production takes place in one country alone.
It follows that the secular decrease in transport costs documented above was likely a driver in the development of global supply chains, and that it benefited trade in goods with long supply chains more than trade in goods with simple supply chains. Similarly, the reduction in tariffs in electronics associated with the Information Technology Agreement of 1997 helped to foster the development of supply chains in Asia (Anderson and Mohs 2011) . The ITA reduced bound and applied tariffs for approximately 95 percent of information technology products to zero on a phased basis. Simple average tariffs for ITA members were an estimated 3.6 percent before the agreement (Bora and Liu 2006) . Some ITA members implemented much larger tariff cuts, including India (from 36.3 percent), China (from 12.7 percent) and Egypt (from 12.1 percent). Trade for ITA products is estimated to run around $4 trillion annually, and to have grown at an 11 percent annual rate over 1996-2008 compared to 7 percent for all trade in manufactures (Anderson and Mohs 2011) . While some of this growth is no doubt due to income-elastic demand for electronics that would have been observed without tariff reductions, the confluence of falling tariff rates and falling transport costs has no doubt contributed to the further development of electronics supply chains in Factory Asia.
At the other extreme, very high trade costs can inhibit the growth of supply chains altogether.
Sub-Saharan Africa is virtually absent from the electronics supply chain, and participates to any great extent only in the supply chain for textiles and apparel, almost exclusively in on the lowest rung of cut, make, and trim assembly (CMT) using imported cloth (Gereffi and Frederick 2010) . There is relatively little in the way of more elaborate relationships between producers and suppliers, such as exist in Bangladesh and Indonesia. While many factors inhibit the growth of the textiles and apparel supply chain, such as lack of electricity, high trade costs associated with maritime and land transport impose severe constraints on apparel producers in sub-Saharan Africa. Due primarily to delays in receiving imported inputs, apparel producers in Swaziland require roughly 130 days to produce and ship apparel to the United States, as compared to 30-5 days for apparel originating in India or China (USITC 2009a, 6-29 to 6-34) . Cost and time delays associated with land transport alone may suffice to disqualify much of sub-Saharan Africa from the "just-in-time" delivery expectations required to participate in the electronics supply chain (Christ and Ferrantino 2011) .
The role of standards in supply chains
It has often been noted that in a world of falling transport costs and tariffs, many of the remaining impediments to trade take the form of NTMs. evidence for these patterns in case studies of Gabon timber exports and Thai cassava exports. In both cases, increased demand from China has pushed these exporters back into earlier stages of the value chain while relaxing the level of standards compliance necessary.
Trade in intermediate goods and trade costs -available evidence
The literature on standards suggests that there may be an association between NTMs and the volume of trade in supply chains, with stronger or more harmonized standards being associated with believe that similar problems persist in the market today. Henson et al. (2000) describe costs associated with meeting regulatory requirements in automotive components and terminal telecommunications equipment between the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. 21 For automotive components, mandatory technical requirements differed among all the countries, and were particularly problematic for such components as seat belts and exhaust systems. In the EU, satisfying standards for technical conformity, safety, and emissions requires laboratory testing to obtain a type approval certificate, with re-testing and reinspection required for relatively small changes. Border inspections are also possible prior to importation. In the United States, there are federal, state, and local standards for automotive products -for example, in California emissions standards are particularly strict. There is also a de facto mandatory quality standard (QS9000) among the "Big Three" (Chrysler, General Motors and Ford).
EU exporters state that the distinction between essential safety regulations and optional quality requirements in the U.S. market is unclear, due in part to the role of private providers of assessment and certification.
As of 2000, the Common Technical Requirements (CTRs) for terminal telecommunications equipment in the EU did not cover all types of terminals and components, requiring U.S.
manufacturers to undergo the costs of meeting various national standards. Even when common EU standards exist, there are costs of testing to obtain the CE mark. Differences within the EU and between the EU, Japan, and the United States limit the ability of manufacturers to achieve economies of scale in the manufacture of components.
As a result of differing standards, companies can either incorporate into the original design the special features demanded by individual markets, or design for the domestic market only and make adaptations once export markets are identified. The former strategy is feasible for large multinationals, but rarely for smaller firms who may lose export markets due to the costs of adapting products. The costs of complying with foreign product requirements and assessments are difficult to assess ex ante, so that firms face significant uncertainty in estimating compliance costs -for example, firms complain that conformity assessment bodies are inconsistent in their assessment of products.
Moreover, non-mandatory or local standards can be at least as problematic as national standards.
It has been argued that procedures of national telephone authorities for approving imported telecommunications are arbitrary, undefined, or unavailable, and designed to limit the importation of foreign telecommunications components. (Linvill et al. 1984) . This characterization, dating from the As discussed above, the way that product standards interact with international trade is complex. Harmonized standards can promote trade, and also make supply chains more efficient. The cost of non-harmonization can be easily viewed in a laptop power supply, which bears many small symbols printed in white indicating various government and private entities that must test the power supply for such reasons as radio non-interference. When harmonization takes place, it is possible for a producer of intermediate goods to follow its customers into more markets and take place in the supply chain in more locations .
Other standards, whose main effect is to add production costs in order to enhance product quality for the final consumer, act more like traditional NTMs and have a trade-reducing effect which can be measured as a tariff equivalent. For standards like these, the traditional cost-benefit considerations apply -do the social benefits of higher product quality and safety outweigh the costs of imposing the standard?
As the center of gravity of the global economy shifts increasingly to large developing economies such as China and India, the demand for unprocessed and intermediate goods changes.
This means not only that poorer suppliers of raw materials are pushed "upstream" in the supply chain, but that their goods are expected to meet lower product standards than they would if they were sold in developed countries. Industrial strategy in developing countries, whether private or public, needs to take this into account. Is it better to sell larger volumes to big developing economies, and save the costs of complying with elaborate product standards, or is it better to bear the costs of standards compliance, sell to developed economies at higher unit values, and possibly retain more steps of the production process at home? Are there sufficient economies of scale at the national level to permit both types of markets to be served simultaneously?
(e) Regional initiatives can help bring supply chains to new parts of the world
The gains from improving efficiency of customs procedures, reducing the number of nonautomatic licenses required, reducing corruption, improving physical conditions in ports, and similar measures can be multiplied if several countries in a region undertake such reforms together. Just as many regions are on the wrong side of the "tipping point" and do not attract global supply chains at present, the simultaneous reduction of trade costs in several neighboring countries is likely to have benefits over and above the benefits to each individual country, as it becomes feasible to locate 29 several steps of a production process in different locations within a region to achieve stage-specific economies of scale.
Mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment procedures have had significant effects on the cost of compliance with standards (Henson et al. 2000) . Regional trade agreements can also lower the costs of NTMs for intermediate goods. For example, the NAFTA enabled U.S.
companies to freely attach their terminal equipment to the Mexican telephone network, and provided that a single laboratory can be recognized to test a telecommunications product in any of the NAFTA countries (Trade Compliance Center).
(f) NTMs affecting logistics and related services are particularly important
In almost all cases, the successful operation of supply chains is facilitated by third-party logistics firms (3PLs), which provide coordinated services in supply-chain consulting, transport management, freight transport services, trade finance, express delivery, wholesale trade, packing, product returns, customs brokerage, and other areas (USITC 2005) . In many countries national policies create barriers to entry for logistic services, which inhibits the growth of supply chains and thus international trade. This suggests one direct connection between trade policy and supply chains.
Measures to liberalize market access in logistic services, whether unilateral, embodied in FTAs, or in the form of GATS commitments, can substantially enhance the feasibility and lower the costs of operating supply chains, with a concomitant growth in international trade.
